Part B

　　Directions:

　　In the following article, some sentences have been removed. For Questions 41-45, choose the most suitable one from the list A-F to fit into each of the numbered blank. There is one extra choice that does not fit in any of the gaps. Mark your answers on ANSWER SHEET 1.(10 points)

　　Theories of the value of art are of two kinds, which we may call extrinsic and intrinsic. The first regards art and the appreciation of art as means to some recognized moral good, while the second regards them as valuable not instrumentally but as objects unto themselves. It is characteristic of extrinsic theories to locate the value of art in its effects on the person who appreciates it. (41) .

　　The extrinsic approach, adopted in modern times by Leo Tolstoy in Chto takoye iskusstvo? (1896; What Is Art?), has seldom seemed wholly satisfactory. Philosophers have constantly sought for a value in aesthetic experience that is unique to it and that, therefore, could not be obtained from any other source. The extreme version of this intrinsic approach is that associated with Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, and the French Symbolists, and summarized in the slogan “art for art’s sake.” (42) .

　　Between those two extreme views there lies, once again, a host of intermediate positions. We believe, for example, that works of art must be appreciated for their own sake, but that, in the act of appreciation, we gain from them something that is of independent value. (43) .

　　The analogy with laughter—which, in some views, is itself a species of aesthetic interest—introduces a concept without which there can be no serious discussion of the value of art: the concept of taste. (44) .

　　Similarly, we regard some works of art as worthy of our attention and others as not. In articulating this judgment, we use all of the diverse and confusing vocabulary of moral appraisal; works of art, like people, are condemned for their sentimentality, coarseness, vulgarity, cruelty, or self-indulgence, and equally praised for their warmth, compassion, nobility, sensitivity, and truthfulness. (The same may apply to the object of natural beauty.) Clearly, if aesthetic interest has a positive value, it is only when motivated by good taste; it is only interest in appropriate objects that can be said to be good for us. (45) .

　　[A] Thus a joke is laughed at for its own sake, even though there is an independent value in laughter, which lightens our lives by taking us momentarily outside ourselves. Why should not something similar be said of works of art, many of which aspire to be amusing in just the way that good jokes are?

　　[B] All discussion of the value of art tends, therefore, to turn from the outset in the direction of criticism: Can there be genuine critical evaluation of art, a genuine distinction between that which deserves our attention and that which does not? (And, once again, the question may be extended to objects of natural beauty.)

　　[C] Art is held to be a form of education, perhaps an education of the emotions. In this case, it becomes an open question whether there might not be some more effective means to the same result. Alternatively, one may attribute a negative value to art, as Plato did in his Republic, arguing that art has a corrupting or diseducative effect on those exposed to it.

　　[D] Artistic appreciation, a purely personal matter, calls for appropriate means of expression. Yet, it is before anything a process of “cultivation”, during which a certain part of one’s “inner self” is “dug out” and some knowledeg of the outside world becomes its match.

　　[E] If I am amused it is for a reason, and this reason lies in the object of my amusement. We thus begin to think in terms of a distinction between good and bad reasons for laughter. Amusement at the wrong things may seem to us to show corruption of mind, cruelty, or bad taste; and when it does so, we speak of the object as not truly amusing, and feel that we have reason on our side.

　　[F] Such thinkers and writers believe that art is not only an end in itself but also a sufficient justification of itself. They also hold that in order to understand art as it should be understood, it is necessary to put aside all interests other than an interest in the work itself.

　　答案

　　41.C 42.F 43.A 44.E 45.B

　　試題精解

　　41.[精解] 本題考核的知識(shí)點(diǎn)是：上下文內(nèi)容的銜接。

　　本題空格出現(xiàn)在第一段末。第一段前兩句提出了兩種藝術(shù)價(jià)值理論：外在理論和內(nèi)在理論�？崭裉幍纳弦痪�，即第三句和空格處后的第一句，即第二段第一句都是對(duì)外在理論的討論。所以，空格處的內(nèi)容應(yīng)該與上下文一致，也對(duì)外在價(jià)值理論予以討論。選項(xiàng)[C]是關(guān)于藝術(shù)對(duì)于藝術(shù)欣賞者的影響，屬于外在價(jià)值理論的觀點(diǎn)，且恰好是對(duì)其上一句的闡釋。

　　42. [精解] 本題考核知識(shí)點(diǎn)：上下文內(nèi)容的銜接 + 段落主題 + 指代詞的理解。

　　本題空格出現(xiàn)在第二段末。從上文來(lái)看，第二段的第二句開(kāi)始由對(duì)藝術(shù)外在價(jià)值理論的討論轉(zhuǎn)入對(duì)藝術(shù)內(nèi)在價(jià)值理論的討論。從下文來(lái)看，緊接空格處的第三段第一句指出：這兩種極端理論之間還有一些折中的觀點(diǎn)。所以，空格處內(nèi)容肯定是對(duì)內(nèi)在價(jià)值理論的討論。[F]為合適選項(xiàng)。且其中的such thinkers and writers恰好指上文提到的 Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde and the French Symbolists，上下文之間銜接自然。

　　43. [精解] 本題考核知識(shí)點(diǎn)：上下文內(nèi)容的銜接 + 段落主題。

　　本空格的上文指出： 藝術(shù)外在價(jià)值理論和藝術(shù)內(nèi)在價(jià)值理論之間存在著折中的觀點(diǎn)：對(duì)于藝術(shù)的欣賞應(yīng)該基于藝術(shù)本身(內(nèi)在)，而對(duì)藝術(shù)的欣賞過(guò)程中則會(huì)有獨(dú)立價(jià)值的東西(外在)。下文中提到：這種和笑聲的類(lèi)比本身就是一種審美價(jià)值。所以，空格處必定是利用“笑聲”來(lái)類(lèi)比折中的藝術(shù)價(jià)值理論。[A]說(shuō)明：笑聲是因?yàn)樾υ挶旧淼目尚?內(nèi)在)，但笑聲又有其獨(dú)立的價(jià)值——點(diǎn)亮我們的生活(外在價(jià)值)。恰好符合上下文的銜接，為正確選項(xiàng)。

　　44. [精解] 本題考核知識(shí)點(diǎn)：和上文內(nèi)容的銜接 + 副詞的運(yùn)用。

　　本空格的上文剛剛引出了一個(gè)新的抽象概念：品味�？崭竦南挛睦�用simiarly說(shuō)明，審美價(jià)值也正面和負(fù)面之分。緊接著，在審美價(jià)值(aesthetic interest)和品味(taste)之間建立聯(lián)系。所以，空格處內(nèi)容必然是對(duì)“品味”進(jìn)行解釋?zhuān)�并說(shuō)明品味有好壞之分。這恰恰是選項(xiàng)[E]的內(nèi)容

　　45. [精解] 本題考核知識(shí)點(diǎn)：對(duì)上文內(nèi)容的總結(jié)

　　本空格出現(xiàn)在文章結(jié)尾處，所以必然是對(duì)上文內(nèi)容的總結(jié)，[B]中 “all discussion of the value of art tends, therefore”非常適合做全文內(nèi)容的總結(jié)。再對(duì)[B]的內(nèi)容進(jìn)行分析，其恰好是基于全文的討論，利用一個(gè)疑問(wèn)句指出對(duì)藝術(shù)價(jià)值評(píng)判的關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題：是否真的存在真正的臨界評(píng)價(jià)。

　　全文翻譯

　　藝術(shù)價(jià)值理論有兩種，我們稱(chēng)之為外在理論和內(nèi)在理論。前者將藝術(shù)和對(duì)藝術(shù)的欣賞看作是達(dá)到某種公認(rèn)的道德利益的手段;而后者看到的不是它們工具性的價(jià)值而是投向自身物體的價(jià)值。外在理論的特點(diǎn)是將藝術(shù)價(jià)值定位于其對(duì)藝術(shù)欣賞者的影響。藝術(shù)被認(rèn)為是一種教育形式，也許是一種情感教育。在這種情況下，是否有一些達(dá)到同樣效果的更有效的方法成了公開(kāi)的問(wèn)題�；蛘�，人們也許認(rèn)為藝術(shù)有負(fù)面價(jià)值，正如柏拉圖在他的《理想國(guó)》一書(shū)里所認(rèn)為的那樣，藝術(shù)會(huì)影響那些接觸它的人，使其墮落，或起不到教化作用。[C]

　　現(xiàn)代社會(huì)中被列夫托爾斯泰吸收進(jìn)1896年出版的《藝術(shù)論》一書(shū)中的外在理論，似乎不能完全令人滿(mǎn)意。哲學(xué)家們一直在不懈地探索唯美體驗(yàn)中的價(jià)值。這種價(jià)值是獨(dú)一無(wú)二的，因此不能從別處獲得。極端的內(nèi)在理論與華特·佩特、奧斯卡·王爾德及法國(guó)印象主義者聯(lián)系在一起，總結(jié)為一句口號(hào)：“為藝術(shù)而藝術(shù)”。這些思想家和作家相信：藝術(shù)的目的在于其本身，而且藝術(shù)也是對(duì)其自身的證明。他們還相信，若要以正確的方式理解藝術(shù)，必須放棄對(duì)其他方面的關(guān)注而只關(guān)注藝術(shù)作品本身。[F]

　　在這兩種極端的觀點(diǎn)之間，有一些折中的觀點(diǎn)。比如，我們認(rèn)為對(duì)藝術(shù)品的欣賞必須基于作品本身，而我們?cè)谛蕾p過(guò)程中能從中獲得一些獨(dú)立的價(jià)值。對(duì)笑話發(fā)笑是因?yàn)樾υ挶旧砜尚�，但笑聲本身又有�?dú)立的價(jià)值，這一價(jià)值使得使我們能在片刻間脫離自己，點(diǎn)亮生活。在這一點(diǎn)上，藝術(shù)作品又何嘗不具有相似性?許多藝術(shù)作品渴望著與好的笑話一樣具有娛樂(lè)性。[A]

　　有些人認(rèn)為，這種和笑聲的類(lèi)比本身就是一種審美價(jià)值。它引進(jìn)了一個(gè)新的概念——品味。若沒(méi)有這一概念，就不可能對(duì)藝術(shù)價(jià)值做嚴(yán)肅的討論。若我感到有趣，肯定有其原因。此“原因”存在于令我感到有趣的對(duì)象。因此，我們開(kāi)始考慮對(duì)令人發(fā)笑的好的原因和壞的原因進(jìn)行區(qū)分。對(duì)不好的事情感到有趣說(shuō)明我們思想墮落、殘忍或?qū)徝姥酃獠?出現(xiàn)這樣的情況，我們會(huì)說(shuō)對(duì)象本身并不真正有趣，我們之所以感到有趣是因?yàn)槲覀冏陨淼脑�因。[E]

　　與之相似的是，我們認(rèn)為某些藝術(shù)品值得關(guān)注，而另外一些卻不值得。在作此判斷時(shí)，我們會(huì)利用各種令人費(fèi)解的、評(píng)判道德的詞匯; 藝術(shù)品和人一樣，會(huì)因?yàn)槠涓袀�、粗俗、殘忍、或自我放縱受到譴責(zé)，會(huì)因?yàn)槠錈崆�、同情、高尚、敏感和真�?shí)受到褒揚(yáng)。顯然，若要有積極的審美價(jià)值，必須有好的審美眼光;只有對(duì)恰當(dāng)?shù)奈矬w感興趣才對(duì)我們有益處。因此，所有對(duì)藝術(shù)價(jià)值的討論都趨向背離了起初的評(píng)論方向：會(huì)有對(duì)藝術(shù)的真正臨界評(píng)價(jià)嗎?即，在值得關(guān)注的作品和不值得關(guān)注的作品之間，存在著真正的界限嗎?[B]